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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
A key role of Department of Defense (DoD) Field Activities is to ensure the United 
States government is a smart buyer for its systems by translating the warfighter’s 
operational requirements into engineering requirements and then providing  product 
definition and development process oversight. As the Navy transitions away from 
building large end-to-end, platform-unique systems toward cross-platform 
capabilities, the role of systems engineering working horizontally across surface ship 
Programs of Record (POR) has become increasingly critical. DoD Field Activities 
continue to focus primarily on the definition and design of capabilities needed to 
close warfighting gaps but with an increased emphasis on the identification of areas 
of commonality. Done properly, these cross-POR systems engineering efforts will 
increase commonality across platforms and increase the potential for competition for 
combat system components. Combined with a new acquisition approach, these 
increased competitive opportunities for a wider range of industry partners will result 
in reduced costs associated with providing combat systems that effectively and 
efficiently meet the warfighter’s needs. 
The Surface Navy is using an Advanced Capability Build (ACB) combat system 
modernization approach to implement warfighting requirements across platforms. 
DoD Field Activities scientists and engineers provide technical leadership for 
systems engineering that will effectively focus industry efforts. This includes 
developing long-range plans for combat system upgrades, developing and 
maintaining combat system-level requirements and architectures, and monitoring the 
 =
=




technical efforts of industry partners implementing the upgrades. A key responsibility 
of the government is to assist in recognizing opportunities for commonality across 
platforms and to lead the combat system design efforts to implement the product line 
acquisition approach and architecture. This paper will examine the systems 
engineering roles of DoD Field Activities and how these roles serve as enablers of 
the DoD industrial base (prime contractors and industry partners) for the acquisition 
of Surface Navy Combat Systems. 
Introduction 
A combat system is an interconnected set of elements (e.g., sensors, weapons, 
vehicle control, combat management software) designed to accomplish a mission plan and 
detect, control, engage, and assess functions across all warfighting mission areas (Program 
Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS, 2008). Each Surface Navy 
platform has a combat system that is used to execute missions assigned to that particular 
platform. The combat system efforts for each ship class are managed by different program 
offices that uniquely tailor the combat systems to best meet the set of missions specifically 
for their ship class. Consequently, the resulting combat systems for each ship class are 
unique products for a relatively small number of ships. The DoD industrial base is currently 
employed to design and build each of these platform-unique combat systems. This 
approach can result in adverse impacts to interoperability, extensibility, mission flexibility, 
and affordability of the combat systems. The vision for future combat system design and 
upgrades is to preserve commonality across platforms so that common operational needs 
are satisfied by common, consistent solutions. 
Delivering common Fleet capabilities that are extensible across multiple platforms 
demands a much greater degree of systems engineering rigor than fielding individual 
platform combat systems. The DoD Field Activities must conduct performance analysis for 
the purpose of defining combat system gaps and capabilities; must perform component 
commonality studies, system requirements development, combat system architecture 
analysis and development, roadmap development, and independent cost analysis to define 
what capabilities are required based on Fleet needs and gaps; and must decide which 
capabilities will be implemented. The products from this analysis will be used to focus the 
industrial base within a new acquisition approach. 
Current State 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the current systems engineering process becomes 
platform-centric very early in the development process as each platform follows its own 
unique solution path. 
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Figure 1. Platform-Centric Systems Engineering Approach 
Primary drivers for the differences between the various combat system 
configurations are the method in which combat systems and system upgrades are acquired 
and the architecture upon which the combat system design is based. Currently, the resource 
sponsor defines the operational requirements for a particular combat system or subsystem.  
Warfighting or operational requirements for joint and naval forces are initially 
expressed in the form of very high level Mission Area Initial Capability Documents (MA-ICD) 
or other capstone statements of mission requirements. For example, a Theater Air and 
Missile Defense (TAMD) MA-ICD was developed in 2004 to describe desired operational 
capabilities and perceived warfighting gaps for naval TAMD forces. These desired force 
capabilities are inherently cross-platform requirements, with a variety of naval and joint 
platforms cooperating to meet the overall force warfighting need. One of the first steps in 
upgrading individual combat systems, in response to the MA-ICD, is to extract the 
capabilities pertaining to a particular combat system and capture the subset of operational 
requirements for that specific combat system.  
For example, a platform-specific operational requirements document (ORD) or 
capabilities development document (CDD) is generated or updated to capture the 
operational capabilities applicable to the particular platform. A weakness in the current 
approach is that each platform performs its own analysis to determine how it should 
contribute to the overall force mission capability and extracts what it perceives to be the 
correct subset of MA-ICD capabilities for inclusion in its own platform-specific CDD. Each 
platform does this in relative isolation from other programs. The resulting CDD then 
becomes the primary driver for further system specification, architecture, and development.  
Funding is provided to each individual program to implement and sustain a system 
that satisfies operational requirements for that particular system. Once the operational 
requirements are known, technical programs contract with industry to design, develop, and 
field systems that satisfy user needs. Each acquisition program is executed in relative 
isolation, developing their own architectural foundation and combat system design. As a 
result, the DoD industrial base is contracted to develop platform-specific combat system 
products that often overlap functionally with similar combat system products for other 
platforms, leading to both programmatic and operational shortcomings. The government 
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must devise a better methodology for focusing the DoD industrial base to resolve these 
shortcomings. 
Way Ahead 
In order to address the shortcomings of the current state, PEO IWS introduced a new 
approach for the acquisition of platform combat systems and associated components. This 
new approach is evolutionary in nature, acquiring new surface combat system capabilities 
and replacing retiring surface combatants through modernization of existing assets from 
established proven surface combatants. This evolutionary approach to combat system 
acquisition forms the basis for the development of new mission specific surface combat 
systems. This approach, which is referred to as the Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 
approach, is currently being applied to Aegis and the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS). 
The PEO IWS Instruction for the Governance of Surface Navy Combat System 
Modernization Through Advanced Capability Builds/Technology Insertions defines ACB as 
“the capability that is delivered to a specific platform in an integrated combat system 
package in a effective, safe, reliable, and readily producible manner” (PEO IWS, 2009). 
Two key precepts with this approach are government-defined system requirements 
and government-controlled combat system architecture with a goal of normalizing system 
requirements and architecture across programs to gain some commonality in software and 
hardware development. PEO IWS uses the term “Product Line” to define this software and 
hardware development approach. Figure 2 illustrates this concept of how the product line 
and common requirements are applied across multiple platforms. 
 
Figure 2. Product Line Approach 
This evolutionary approach consists of a single cross-combat system capability 
planning phase and multiple individual combat system execution phases. PEO IWS 
oversees a capability planning phase that defines the scope of new capability upgrades and 
maintenance fixes, the system release to which these improvements will be applied, and the 
existing development efforts that will be leveraged and integrated to realize these 
capabilities. This phase commences with a Field Activity-led examination of Fleet needs and 
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gaps, available technology and third party development efforts, and the funding available for 
these upgrades. Trade studies and prioritizations are conducted to define the actual 
capability list to be implemented across several ship classes. Further definition focuses on 
individual components that can be developed as common across these ship classes. This 
phase concludes with the definition of system-level requirements and architecture products 
for these specific capabilities, including a successful system requirements review (SRR) for 
the new integrated capability upgrades. This government-led capability planning phase 
enables the DoD industrial base to focus on development and integration of capability 
upgrades with applicability to multiple platforms.  
In order to progress through system development and maintain cost and schedule, it 
is important to exit the capability planning phase and begin execution of development efforts 
with a well-defined and affordable industry technical work package and combat system 
capability development approach. Using this work package, DoD industrial base leads the 
efforts to develop, integrate, and field these combat systems with government oversight.  
Focusing the Industrial Base 
There are four primary areas in the new acquisition approach that help to focus the 
efforts of the industrial base. Three of these areas are applicable to the capability planning 
phase: Combat System Roadmap, Capability Requirements Analysis, and Capability 
Architecture Analysis. The fourth area is the ACB Execution. Each of these four areas will 
be described, along with how each helps to focus or enable the DoD industrial base. 
Combat System Roadmap 
The primary tool used to guide government-led efforts is a Combat System 
Roadmap, which captures ACB fielding plans across Surface Navy platforms. This PEO 
IWS-approved roadmap is used to ensure that selected components are being developed 
based on a common architecture framework and that all components will come together as 
a system. The roadmap is a concise summary of a planned capability addition or upgrade to 
a subsystem, component, or element and includes several key features. These key features 
include the following: 
 a listing of additional capabilities or upgrades planned for the system; 
 a brief description of the additional capabilities or upgrades; 
 a time-phased plan for rolling out the additional capabilities or upgrades, 
preferably tied to particular ACBs for the targeted host combat system(s); 
 any known dependencies or relationships between these capabilities or 
upgrades and those planned for other related systems, particularly if a 
package must be delivered together to a combat system platform; and 
 funding profiles related to the additional capabilities or upgrades. 
The government must work to quantify these features using systems engineering 
principles. The use of mission thread analysis is a significant part of this. In a conventional 
mission thread analysis, a particular operational problem or challenge is examined in detail 
from end-to-end to attempt to determine alternatives and best options for addressing that 
challenge. The multi-platform mission thread analysis extends conventional analysis by 
identifying shared operational needs across platforms and evaluating common solutions 
where appropriate. 
The expected performance of current combat systems is determined through 
analysis of operational effectiveness including such measures as probability of kill of a 
threat, survival of the examined unit or force, or attainment of mission objectives over time. 
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Often, this analysis will reveal weaknesses or capability gaps that should be addressed 
through future combat system product line upgrades. The results of this gap analysis 
become a more detailed statement of the operational problem and set the stage for 
identification of options for closing the operational gaps. So, the next step of mission thread 
analysis is identifying the possible (or leading) options for additional capabilities or 
upgrades. 
Capability enhancements require performance upgrades to multiple combat system 
elements, so the interdependencies between these elements must be well understood. An 
understanding of how these element upgrades impact all mission areas is also required. 
This may require the implementation of multiple elements to achieve single mission 
improvement, but when applied can actually enhance multiple mission areas. This becomes 
particularly relevant in the fiscally constrained environment which typically results in a 
reduction of capability to meet budget. 
Understanding how the option or upgrade will be integrated with the combat system 
is another key factor. This can be conveyed through system architecture and can define 
interface options as well as multiple concepts of integration. Understanding the various 
options can give a choice in terms of complexity and, ultimately, cost. This information can 
be used in trade studies with the metrics supporting the prioritization of capabilities. PEO 
IWS and DoD Field Activities work together to recommend to the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) these capability-upgrade candidates for inclusion in an ACB. These 
decisions initiate the system requirements and architecture definition efforts leading to the 
SRR. The products of the SRR form the technical work package that focuses the efforts of 
the industrial base. 
Capability Requirements Analysis 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, mission thread analysis is essential to the 
requirements elicitation process. To do this, a detailed operational scenario is first 
established by OPNAV. The mission thread scenarios themselves depict force-level 
employment of a system of combat systems to counter the threats under consideration, 
according to an accepted concept of operations, and from approved sources such as design 
reference missions for programs slated to receive the combat systems under analysis. Once 
a set of operationally relevant scenarios is selected for the mission thread analysis, the 
scenario is examined by the Field Activity using current combat system capabilities and 
inventories. The expected performance of current combat systems is determined through 
analysis of operational effectiveness, including such measures as probability of kill, survival 
of the examined unit or force, or attainment of mission objectives over time. Often, this 
analysis will reveal weaknesses or capability gaps that should be addressed through future 
combat system product line upgrades. The results of this gap analysis lead to a more 
detailed statement of the operational problem for OPNAV and set the stage for identification 
of technical solutions for PEO IWS. 
Requirements analysis is further performed on the top-level cross-platform mission 
area requirements for a capability using the multi-platform mission thread analysis approach 
described earlier. This approach views the platforms as swim lanes for the analysis and 
high-level combat system functions allocated to these platforms in an end-to-end analysis. 
After a sufficient number of iterations and decomposition of this process, the aggregated 
functions are then translated into a set of operational requirements for each platform. In this 
manner, the operational requirements are integrated and deconflicted.  
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Based on the resulting operational requirements (i.e., CDD), subsequent 
requirements analysis efforts focus at the system-level to identify common versus unique 
combat system requirements. Therefore, in addition to allocating operational requirements 
to each affected system’s CDD or NCD in a coordinated manner, those capabilities common 
across platforms are identified up front. All common requirements are then generated and 
included in a product line system requirements database that contains the common 
requirements in context of the common architectural framework across all platforms. 
Platform-unique requirements continue to be defined by the individual programs. 
Accordingly, a full system-level requirements specification for each program consists of 
program-unique requirements and common requirements from the product line system 
requirements database. These requirements form the basis for what the government will 
contract with the industrial base to develop, integrate, and field.  
Capability Architecture Analysis 
The government has a leadership role in the development of combat system level 
architecture. A System-Subsystem Design Description (SSDD) document is developed by 
the Field Activity and used to describe the functional and physical architecture of a combat 
system. This product, coupled with the combat system requirements, is provided to the 
industry at SRR and is used to define the work package for development. 
Development of the SSDD requires additional architecture analysis beyond what is 
used to define the contents of the ACB. The goal of the architectural analysis is to provide a 
mapping of the operational requirements onto a system that can deliver the desired 
capabilities. However, conducting this analysis introduces several new challenges when 
compared to architectural analysis for a single ship combat system. These challenges 
include the following: 
 assessing and resolving architectural differences between members of the 
product line, 
 developing and upgrading a common product line objective architecture, 
 determining appropriate migration plans, and 
 integrating architectural plans and schedules between product line members. 
The architectural analysis and the requirements analysis are conducted concurrently 
because the outputs and results of each analysis effort feed the other. At the cross-platform 
level of analysis, one of the major goals of the architecture effort is to map the required 
operational capabilities for the force onto the components of the force, which at this level, 
are the individual ship combat systems. The output of the architecture effort is a partitioned 
set of requirements, allocated appropriately across the platforms. These partitioned 
requirements can then be mapped onto each combat system’s system-level architecture to 
come up with the appropriate partitioning of requirements at the system level. 
In general, surface combatants are multi-mission platforms. As a result, they can 
participate in multiple mission areas at the same time. For example, an Aegis combatant 
routinely supports TAMD, undersea warfare, and strike warfare concurrently. The 
operational architectures for each of these warfare areas are different but must be woven 
together into a single, cohesive system design at the platform level. This introduces 
additional architectural considerations that must be addressed at the system level over and 
above those mandated when considering the mission operational requirements alone. For 
example, as Ballistic Missile Defense operational capabilities are integrated, resource and 
multi-warfare interactions with other air defense requirements of the ship as well as manning 
constraints and interactions with other mission areas must also be considered. 
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An objective combat systems product line architectural framework has been defined 
that should provide the functionality desired, but this architectural vision has not been 
realized in any of the current product line members. However, initial steps are being taken to 
move members of the product line towards this architectural goal. For example, common 
components for track management are under development for use in both the Aegis and the 
SSDS combat systems. These common components meet the requirements for both 
platforms as well as conform to the product line architecture. When integrated, they will 
represent the first tangible results of the product line systems engineering process. 
ACB Execution 
ACB execution represents the combat system design, development, and fielding 
phase in the new acquisition approach. The government continues to perform its traditional 
oversight role and certifies the combat system for operational use and now has the lead for 
defining the combat system design. The DoD industrial base has the lead for the 
development, integration, and fielding of the combat system. Because of the efforts during 
the capability planning phase, the government can focus the industrial base more effectively 
during the development and integration phases. 
During the capability planning phase, the government leads the development of the 
system level requirements and architecture. As stated earlier, these products form the 
technical work package for industry, and as such focus the efforts of industry on specific 
combat system upgrades. The government retains ownership of these products throughout 
the ACB execution phase.  
All design evaluations are performed in context of these products, and any design 
efforts that drive a change to these products must be adjudicated between government and 
the industrial base. In this way, the industrial base better understands the expectations of 
the government, and these expectations have been derived via a top-down, cross-platform 
analysis effort. Therefore, other individual combat system acquisition efforts will be 
developing capabilities that are applicable to multiple programs, instead of multiple 
independent design efforts for similar products. Industry is better able to help solve the 
programmatic and operational shortcomings of the current state by being focused 
appropriately by government-led planning, analysis, and definition activities. The ACB 
execution phase becomes more of a partnership, with expectations better articulated and 
tangible and objective criteria defined to ensure that the resulting industry-developed 
products satisfy the government’s needs and fit within the boundary conditions to enable 
use across multiple platforms. 
Conclusion 
The DoD Field Activity has a unique role in the new Surface Navy Combat Systems 
Development Strategy. They provide unbiased technical expertise to aid in the decisions 
made for acquisition. The Field Activities scientists and engineers are able to take a broad 
look across multiple systems and identify opportunities to implement common requirements 
and architecture. They are also able to understand the technical detail required by the 
industrial base to develop and field a system. By using the Field Activities, the DoD 
industrial base can deliver with the benefit of developing a system that can be applicable to 
a broader number of platforms while permitting the taxpayer the cost benefit of paying for 
smarter systems engineering. 
Cross-POR systems engineering efforts led by DoD Field Activities is increasing the 
component-level commonality across Surface Navy Combat Systems. This change in 
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approach away from traditional platform-unique solutions is resulting in efficiencies in 
technical requirement definition and component design. Field Activities, as enablers of the 
industrial base, are assisting OPNAV in articulating better defined and firmer requirements; 
PEO IWS in describing executable product line architecture and common source 
components to lesson development cost; and industry partners by providing clearly 
documented system requirements and architecture so they can “build to print.” These DoD 
Field Activity efforts will provide the government the ability to better focus the DoD industrial 
base to ensure success of combat system fielding maximizing estimated warfighting value 
while reducing costly duplicative development efforts. 
NSWCDD, like other DoD field activities, will continue to provide technical analysis to 
support Pre-Milestone B acquisition and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) budget 
decisions that focus the industrial base. DoD Field Activities are key to the understanding of 
technical system knowledge for the DoD operational and acquisition communities and 
translating that knowledge into achievable capabilities through requirements documents. 
These documents guide industrial base partners to build the platforms and systems needed 
by the warfighter. Working together, government, industry, and academia can produce a 
capable and affordable future for our military. 
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